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Abstract
The number of patent applications and "bad" patents issued has been rising rapidly in
recent years. Based on this trend, we study the overload problem within the Patent Oﬃce
and its consequences on the ﬁrms' R&D incentives. We assume that the examination process
of patent applications is imperfect, and that its quality is poorer under congestion. Depend-
ing on policy instruments such as submission fees and the toughness of the non-obviousness
requirement, the system may result in a high-R&D equilibrium, in which ﬁrms self-select
in their patent applications, or in an equilibrium with low R&D, opportunistic patent ap-
plications and the issuance of bad patents. Multiple equilibria often coexist, which deeply
undermines the eﬀectiveness of policy instruments. We investigate the robustness of our
conclusions as to how the value of patent protection is formalized, taking into consideration
the introduction of a penalty system for rejected patent applications, as well as the role of
commitment to a given IP protection policy.
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1 Introduction
In January 2009, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce released a statement opening with the following
assessment: "Today, the U.S.Patent and Trademark Oﬃce is an agency in crisis facing signiﬁcant
challenges".1 Despite an aggressive hiring campaign and a growing annual budget in the last
10 years, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO) has not kept up with the increasing
number of new applications.2 The number of litigated patents is rising faster than patent grants,
and half of the patents contested in court are invalidated.3 As a result, there is now a widespread
perception that patent quality has been undermined, as some critics accuse the USPTO of issuing
low-quality patents that violate the patentability criteria of novelty and non-obviousness, such
as Amazon.com's checkout cart for online shopping.4
Chief among the underlying causes behind a lower patent quality is the creation of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) by Congress in 1982. Through a series
of decisions, the CAFC has expanded the scope of patentable subject matter to include business
methods, software, and some biotechnology products and processes.5 This in turn encouraged
patent applications: between 1990 and 2005, the yearly number of applications rose from 175,000
to 380,000.6 With patent application ﬁling rates projected to increase by 8% annually, this trend
is unlikely to change in the near future.7 As a result, the Patent Oﬃce is now experiencing
workload pressures: the number of applications per examiner ratio increased about 25% in the
last ﬁve years and the time the examiner spends on each application is shorter (Lemley and
Shapiro, 2005).8 In this paper, we study the overload problem of the Patent Oﬃce and its
impact on ﬁrms' R&D incentives.
1Source: U.S. Chamber of Commerce's recommendations for U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, http :
//www.theglobalipcenter.com/images/gipc_images/pdfs/usptopatentproject.pdf
2The backlog of pending patents is now approaching a record 800,000, and average approval time has
stretched to 31 months. Source: USPTO Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2008, http :
//www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2008/
3Since 1991, the compound annual growth rates of patents grants and patent infringement cases are respectively
3.8% and 5.8%. Source: 2008 Patent Litigation Study, PricewaterhouseCoopers Int. Ltd. According to Allison
and Lemley (1998), only 54% of the patents contested in court are ruled valid.
4See for example the Wall Street Journal editorial "Patently Absurd" (A14, March 1, 2006).
5See Gallini (2002) for a review of those changes.
6Source: U.S. Patent Oﬃce annual reports.
7See http : //www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/stratplan2007 − 2012.pdf , Source: USPTO 2007-
2012 Strategic Plan
8This is also an issue at the European Patent Oﬃce, where the number of hours spent examining each patent
claim has more than halved since 1992, from 23.8 hours in 1992 to 11.8 hours in 2001. Source: Alison Abbott,
"Pressured staﬀ 'lose faith' in patent quality ", Nature 429 (3 June 2004).
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For an invention to be patentable in the U.S., four requirements must be met: statutory,
usefulness, novelty and non-obviousness.9 In order to assess novelty and non-obviousness, an
examiner of the Patent Oﬃce conducts a search of prior art, reviewing patents and non-patent
literature (i.e. what has been used or described before). If he ﬁnds all the features of the
invention in a single prior art reference, he rejects the application for not meeting the novelty
requirement. If not, he goes on to verify that the invention is not obvious in view of the prior
art, i.e. that it is "suﬃciently diﬀerent" from the prior art (as worded by the USPTO), above a
minimum standard of inventiveness.10 Therefore, if invalidating prior art exists but has not been
found by the examiner, the patent is granted by mistake. Missing invalidating prior art turns
out to be the main source of mistakes for examiners: according to Allison and Lemley (1998) and
Cockburn and al. (2002), most patent invalidations are issued on the basis of obviousness or lack
of novelty.11 This is more likely to happen as examiners lack the time to review thoroughly all
the relevant prior art for each application, especially in recent patentable areas such as software
and business methods where most prior art is unpatented (and thus harder to ﬁnd).
We introduce a model in which ﬁrms invest in risky R&D activity resulting in inventions
of diﬀerent qualities, which are their private information. Firms can seek protection for their
projects by applying for a patent. The Patent Oﬃce then processes their claims, but examiners
may not ﬁnd out all the relevant prior art for a given patent application as they assess its degree
of novelty or non-obviousness. The imperfect observability of these characteristics can lead to
mistakenly granted patents. Such mistakes make it easier to obtain a patent, so more people ﬁle
a patent application, therefore placing a heavier burden on the examiners, which further dete-
riorates the quality of examination. We formalize this overload or congestion phenomenon and
analyze these strategic complementarities between the application strategies and the examination
process.
9In the U.S. code on Patents (35 U.S.C.), Usefulness is described in section 101, novelty in section 102 and
non-obviousness in section 103. In Europe, the equivalent requirements are statutory subject matter, industrial
application, novelty and inventive step.
10Hunt (1999) deﬁnes a non-obvious invention as "a nontrivial extension of what is already known". In his
paper, discoveries are improvements to the quality of products, and the standard of non-obviousness sets the
minimum extent of improvement which can result in a patent. Anything below the standard goes into the public
domain. For an extensive survey of the economic analysis of the non-obviousness requirement, see Denicolo (2008).
11Cockburn and al. (2002) study 182 cases, half of which ended up in an invalidation by the CAFC, 37% of
which on the basis of novelty (Section 102) and 47% for obviousness (Section 103). Allison and Lemley (1998)
ﬁnd that "sections 102 and 103 account for 138 out of 191 total determinations of invalidity".
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We characterize equilibrium R&D and patent application strategies depending on the values
of two policy instruments: submission fees, and the strength of the non-obviousness requirement.
Within some range of values, the IP protection system is very eﬀective, as it leads to a unique
high-R&D equilibrium in which ﬁrms self-select in their decision to apply, and the imperfection
of the examination process is therefore inconsequential. Outside of that range, however, the IP
protection system is less eﬀective: we show there exists an equilibrium in which some patents,
that we call bad patents, are issued, although they would not have been issued under a perfect
examination process. In some case, the equilibrium may be unique and characterized by low
R&D. In some other cases, there may be multiple equilibria in the number and the quality of
patent applications, some unattractive equilibria being characterized by low R&D and yet many
patent applications and the issuance of bad patents, and some other, more eﬀective equilibria
characterized by high R&D and only good patents issued. The unattractive equilibrium cannot
be dismissed easily as it is preferred ex ante by ﬁrms. Moreover, the design of policy instruments
to stimulate R&D would inevitably lead to a range of parameters where multiplicity of equilibria
is prevalent. These results illustrate a weakening of standard control instruments when Patent
Oﬃces face serious congestion problems. Marginal changes in these instruments cannot solve
the equilibrium selection problem faced by the Oﬃce and they have a limited impact on ﬁrms'
strategies. In equilibrium, the Oﬃce must tolerate unwarranted patent applications and bad
patents as a necessary evil.
We extend our basic setting in several directions and prove that our conclusions are by-
and-large robust, in particular with respect to how the value of patent protection is formalized.
We also consider the possibility of enlarging the set of instruments and introduce a penalty for
rejected patent applications: such a penalty unambiguously improves the situation, although
the characterization of equilibria remains similar in nature. Finally, we prove that the Patent
Oﬃce's commitment power on the IP protection policy, in particular on the toughness of the
non-obviousness criterion, is critical and we show that in the absence of such commitment, R&D
incentives vanish entirely.
The theoretical economic literature on patents has paid little attention to the patent Oﬃce,
and its examination process has not yet been formalized. Two exceptions are Langinier and
Marcoul (2003) and Atal and Bar (2008), who address the issue of prior art search and disclosure
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by innovators. Langinier and Marcoul study agency problems that can arise between an examiner
and an inventor: moral hazard on the inventor's search of prior art and adverse selection on
whatever information he chooses to disclose in the application. Atal and Bar (2008) focus on
innovators' incentives to search for prior art, before undertaking R&D and before applying for a
patent. By contrast, we do not consider incentives to search for prior art (for the examiner); we
elaborate on an idea outlined in Caillaud (2003) and Hall (2009), focusing on the impact of the
Oﬃce on ﬁrms' incentives to innovate and to apply for patent protection. Our paper is close to
Chiou (2008), who investigates the substitutability between the Patent Oﬃce examination eﬀort
and the eﬀort made by other actors in the industry, to assess the quality and novelty of a patent
application.
Many contributions in the literature analyze the impact of submission fees or of patentabil-
ity standards on the innovation process.12 A few papers focus on the optimal design of these
instruments by a Patent Oﬃce. Lemley (2001) argues that it is eﬃcient to implement a low
examination standard, because the costs of improving the examination process and the quality
of issued patents would outweigh the cost of the mistakes currently made (the Patent Oﬃce is
"rationally ignorant"). Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) and Scotchmer (1999) study the design
of renewal application fees and their impact on R&D. In those articles, patent life is endoge-
nously chosen by ﬁrms via the renewal application fee. Scotchmer (1999) considers a model of
asymmetric information where the Patent Oﬃce cannot observe the costs and beneﬁts of ﬁrms'
innovations. She shows that the only feasible incentive mechanisms are equivalent to patent re-
newal systems (where ﬁrms must pay back money to the Patent Oﬃce to extend their patents).
Cornelli and Schankerman (1999) show that it can be welfare-improving to diﬀerentiate patent
lives when ﬁrms have diﬀerent R&D productivity, which is unobservable by the Patent Oﬃce.
By contrast, we argue that these instruments may be of limited use to improve the performances
of the IP protection system.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 characterizes
the diﬀerent equilibria. In Section 4 we discuss the issue of multiplicity and we derive the
comparative statics of the diﬀerent equilibria, including the impact of submission fees and the
12See e.g. O'Donoghue (1998), Hunt (1999 and 2004), and for a general view, Scotchmer (2004), on the impact
of patentability requirements on the R&D process.
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non-obviousness standard; ﬁnally, we introduce new possible instruments, such as a penalty in
case of patent denial. In Section 5 we study and discuss various extensions of the model, while
Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We consider an industry consisting of a continuum of ﬁrms of mass 1.13 Firms invest in risky
R&D activities that generate more or less innovative new technologies or products that we call
projects. They can seek protection for their projects by applying for a patent to the Patent
Oﬃce. The Patent Oﬃce processes claims and grants or denies protection, based on the results
of an examination process. R&D activities are formalized in a rather standard way and we focus
on the nature and imperfections of the examination process to investigate its impact on the pace
of technical progress within the industry.
Each ﬁrm chooses an R&D eﬀort level pi in [0, 1) at cost γ(pi). The R&D outcome is a
project characterized by its innovativeness θ, θ ∈ [0, 1). θ = 0 stands for a non-novel project
that is already part of the existing prior art; a larger θ in (0, 1) refers to a project that is more
innovative and farther from the frontier of existing prior art. R&D eﬀort pi determines the
stochastic distribution of the project innovativeness, and a higher eﬀort generates stochastically
higher innovativeness (according to ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance). We assume a speciﬁc
distribution for θ to capture these elements: with probability 1− pi, θ = 0 and with probability
pi, θ is drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, pi]. So, the c.d.f. equals 1 − pi at θ = 0 and
1− pi + θ for θ ∈ (0, pi].
A ﬁrm can either seek protection of a patent for its project, or forgo institutional protection.
We assume the project has value v under patent protection and 0 otherwise. v should be in-
terpreted as the diﬀerence between the discounted expected proﬁts from the project when it is
protected by a patent and the discounted expected proﬁts of the best alternative strategy for the
ﬁrm. Depending on the industry, this strategy can take several forms: e.g. letting the innovation
13It is not clear whether the market for patent applications is concentrated or not: two dozen ﬁrms account for
one ﬁfth of all patents granted by the USPTO (Source: USPTO website and IFI Patent Intelligence 2008 report,
see http://www.iﬁclaims.com/IFIPatents010909.htm). However, what matters is whether ﬁrms take into account
the impact of their applications on the Oﬃce's congestion or, as we assume here, if they are "congestion-takers".
It seems that even a large innovative company does not decide upon its IP protection strategy on the basis of
how much congestion it will induce at the Patent Oﬃce.
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fall into the public domain and secure short-term monopoly proﬁts before imitation, or keeping
the innovation secret and getting the associated monopoly rent as long as there has not been
informational leakage or imitation. v may therefore be large for product innovations that cannot
be kept secret and can be easily duplicated, while it may be small when secrecy is an eﬀective
mode of protection. The normalization of non-protected proﬁts to 0 has the consequence that
ﬁrms would engage in 0-R&D in the absence of any patent protection; given the previous inter-
pretation, pi = 0 should not be interpreted literally as no R&D but rather as the natural level of
R&D that prevails in the industry in the absence of an institutional IP protection system.
That the value of a patent does not depend on the project innovativeness is admittedly a
restrictive assumption. We relax it in an extension and show that our analysis is qualitatively
robust. Another restriction is that the value of a patent does not depend on the number of
patents granted. Hence, we rule out market interactions among potential innovations and market
structure issues, assuming basically that projects can be marketed independently on isolated
markets. We relax this assumption as well and show how this introduces a force counter-acting
the congestion phenomena.
A ﬁrm applying for a patent has to pay an application fee f ≥ 0. We focus on two standards
of patentability: novelty and non-obviousness, and we formalize the patent examination process
as follows. Investigating novelty and non-obviousness mostly relies on the examiners searching
for existing prior art (existing patents, non-patented literature such as publications and non-
protected inventions that already cover the claims contained in the application).14 The search
of prior art yields the examiner an imperfect signal σ, whose stochastic distribution depends
on the true innovativeness as well as on the eﬃciency of the examination process. It can be
viewed as an assessment of the frontier of knowledge in the ﬁeld and we assume that the major
source of imperfection rests on the risk of not identifying a recent or more advanced step in the
technology, i.e. of not ﬁnding all relevant prior art, so that the innovativeness of a project can
only be over-estimated by examiners.
To formalize these elements, we assume that σ is distributed on {θ, 1} with Pr{σ = θ} =
14Note that in a dynamic setting, an increase in the number of patents makes the future search of examiners
easier since the prior art will mostly be patented. For example, searching prior art and determining novelty on
software patent applications becomes easier now that more software is patented than in the early 1980's when
most of the prior art was not patented.
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1−h = 1−Pr{σ = 1}. The eﬃciency of the examination process is aﬀected by congestion, which
is captured by supposing h = h(n), where h(.) is increasing within [0, 1]: the larger the number
of applications, the more diﬃcult for an examiner to study the ﬁeld of each application, the less
likely he is to ﬁnd all the relevant prior art.
>From this formalization, it follows immediately that σ = 0 means that an identical invention
already exists in the prior art, so the application does not pass the novelty test. If σ > 0, the ap-
plication passes the novelty test. Then two situations can arise, depending on a non-obviousness
requirement σ∗ > 0 that characterizes the mandate of the Patent Oﬃce: the application passes
the non-obviousness test (and therefore is patented) if and only if σ ≥ σ∗. It follows that the
probability of obtaining a patent for a project θ is equal to 1 if θ ≥ σ∗ and to h if θ < σ∗.
We take the non-obviousness standard σ∗ and the submission fee f as given: the Patent Oﬃce
is an agent for the Congress, or a regulation authority or more generally for a social planner,
and these policy instruments are ﬁxed and well established, perhaps as a result of an optimal
design, of congressional decisions, of legal judgements or of the reputation of the Oﬃce. Firms
simultaneously engage in R&D programs, develop projects and choose to apply for a patent or
not. Then, the Patent Oﬃce evaluates all applications and grants or denies patent protection,
depending on the outcome of the examination process. We therefore adopt a positive view of the
IP protection system and characterize the equilibrium in terms of R&D and patent applications
in a given institutional framework.
To address the normative question of the optimal design of the IP protection system, in par-
ticular of these instruments (f, σ∗), we should consider explicit social objectives that incorporate
the social welfare value of innovations, the cost of R&D and the deadweight losses associated
with the monopoly positions created by patents, and we should then determine the system that
maximizes these objectives ex ante. The analysis would be immediate if the examination tech-
nology is perfect (i.e. if h(n) = 0 for all n). But with an imperfect examination technology, we
will argue that equilibrium multiplicity becomes a major issue for most values of (f, σ∗), thereby
preventing a meaningful analysis of the issue of the optimal design of the IP protection system.
Therefore, we content ourselves with a positive analysis; we will simply refer to one normative
aspect: reducing the number of patents in equilibrium, while maintaining R&D constant, is
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socially beneﬁcial as it reduces the overall deadweight loss.15
The subjectivity and the lack of measurability of the non-obviousness standard might make
it diﬃcult for the Patent Oﬃce to commit to a rigorous examination (see Kahin (2001)).16
Moreover, in a dynamic perspective, the policy of IP protection may evolve over time. So, as an
extension, we investigate another polar case in which σ∗ is determined ex post, once R&D has
already been done and ﬁrms' applications have been submitted.
A related remark is that the Patent Oﬃce is not a sophisticated player; in fact, it is not
even strategic in most of the analysis except in the extension in which σ∗ is determined ex post.
In real life, Patent Oﬃces receive new applications and take new decisions every year. They
can rely on other various instruments that could be changed over time, such as the number
of examiners employed, or the backlog of unexamined applications (which may signal a high
quality examination, where examiners spend more time on each application). Our simple model,
assuming either full commitment to an exogenous examination process or assuming a simple
second-mover situation in which σ∗ is determined ex post, is a ﬁrst preliminary step in analyzing
the role of the Patent Oﬃce, before developing a fully dynamic analysis in which the issue of
deﬁning the Patent Oﬃce's objective function should be addressed.
Finally, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. γ(.) is increasing, convex from [0, 1) to [0,+∞), γ(0) = γ′(0) = 0 and
limpi→1−
(
γ′(pi)
γ(pi)
)
= +∞. We let φ(.) denote the inverse marginal R&D cost function: φ(.) =
γ′−1(.).
This leads to the following technical lemma, whose proof is immediate, hence omitted.
Lemma 1. Let Aσ(.) be deﬁned for x ∈ [0,+∞) by:
Aσ(x) = x(φ(x)− σ)− γ(φ(x));
Aσ(.) is convex, Aσ(0) = 0, limx→∞Aσ(x) = +∞; it has a unique minimum attained at γ′(σ)
and, for σ > 0, the equation Aσ(x) = 0 has a unique positive root a(σ) and a(σ) increases in σ.
15Note that in a dynamic setting, it could be argued that patents have also a beneﬁcial impact per se as they
speed up the diﬀusion of knowledge in the economy.
16Moreover, to analyze a repeated game we would have to introduce a litigation stage and the possibility of
patent invalidation after issuance, or an opposition procedure like in the European Patent Oﬃce. This goes
beyond the scope of the paper.
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It turns out that in the following analysis, a(σ∗) is the appropriate way to measure how tough
the non-obviousness standard σ∗ is.
3 Equilibrium analysis
In this section, we provide the complete equilibrium analysis in our setting.17 In each case,
we posit an equilibrium R&D eﬀort pi∗ and the set of values of θ for which ﬁrms apply for
patent protection in equilibrium. We ﬁnd necessary conditions for this application strategy to
be a best response for ﬁrms. We then deduce the optimal application decision of a ﬁrm that
deviates by investing pi 6= pi∗ in R&D and compute the expected proﬁts from such a deviation.
These expected proﬁts have potentially two local extrema, one at 0 and one within (σ∗, 1); the
detailed analysis, relegated in the appendix, consists in comparing these two extrema. This
gives us necessary conditions for the posited strategies to actually sustain an equilibrium, these
conditions being suﬃcient in all cases.
Given the nature of the examination process, it is immediate that a project θ, with θ ≥ σ∗,
applies for a patent if and only if v ≥ f , while a project θ, with θ < σ∗, applies if and only
if h(n)v ≥ f , where n is the expected number of applications. The following lemma is then
immediate.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium, if a ﬁrm of type θ < σ∗ applies with positive probability, then all
ﬁrms with θ > σ∗ apply with probability 1; and if a ﬁrm of type θ > σ∗ does not apply, no ﬁrm
with θ < σ∗ applies with positive probability.
This lemma rules out equilibria where the Patent Oﬃce only receives applications from the
most obvious projects.18 It shows that, besides pi∗, equilibria can be characterized by m∗+ and
m∗−, the masses of applications for patent coming from projects with θ ∈ (σ∗, pi∗] and with
θ ∈ [0, σ∗] respectively.19 The imperfect examination technology will lead to patents being
granted to projects that would not be patented under perfect examination, i.e. to projects such
17More precisely, we provide the analysis for equilibria under pure strategies with respect to the choice of R&D
eﬀort. In the basic setting this is without loss of generality for almost all values of the parameters of the model
(see footnote 21 below).
18We do not consider dynamic issues where the backlog of pending applications could discourage the best
innovators to apply. Instead, we focus on situations where the patent system still serves its initial purpose of
attracting the best innovators.
19When pi∗ < σ∗, m∗+ = 0 and only m
∗
− matters.
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that θ < σ∗; for this reason, we will call these bad patents, although ex post all patents are
costly in the economy because of the monopoly deadweight loss they create.
For ease of presentation, we distinguish cases according to the level of equilibrium R&D:
high-R&D equilibria, and low-R&D equilibria or no-R&D equilibria, depending on whether the
equilibrium R&D eﬀort is above σ∗ or within [0, σ∗].
3.1 High-R&D equilibria
We explore ﬁrst the existence of a high-R&D equilibrium, i.e. with positive R&D such that
σ∗ < pi∗. There must exist some ﬁrms applying for patent protection otherwise R&D would
just be a pure waste. So, necessarily v ≥ f and at least highly-innovative projects with θ > σ∗
apply for protection, hence m∗+ > 0. Lemma 2 implies that: m∗− > 0 ⇒ m∗+ = pi∗ − σ∗ and
m∗+ < pi∗ − σ∗ ⇒ m∗− = 0.
Suppose that m∗− = 0 and 0 < m∗+ < pi∗ − σ∗. Since ﬁrms θ > σ∗ face the same problem
ex post and do not all apply, they must be indiﬀerent so that necessarily: v = f . But then, the
expected proﬁt function is simply equal to the cost −γ(pi), hence decreasing. Such an equilibrium
with pi∗ > σ∗ cannot exist. Therefore, m∗+ = pi∗ − σ∗, i.e. in any high-R&D equilibrium, all
projects with θ ≥ σ∗ apply for patent protection. Let us call separating, an equilibrium with
m∗− = 0, i.e. in which projects with θ < σ∗ refrain from applying for patent protection, pooling,
an equilibrium withm∗− = 1+σ∗−pi∗, i.e. in which all projects apply, and mixed, an equilibrium
with 0 < m∗− < 1 + σ∗ − pi∗, i.e. in which some projects with θ < σ∗ apply. We obtain the
following characterization:
Proposition 1. If v < f , no high-R&D equilibrium exists. When v ≥ f :
• there exists a high-R&D separating equilibrium if and only if f + a(σ∗) ≤ v and
h(φ(v − f)− σ∗)v ≤ f ; (1)
then, pi∗ = φ(v − f) and φ(v − f)− σ∗ patents are issued;
• there exists a high-R&D mixed equilibrium if and only if f + a(σ∗) ≤ v, f ≤ h(1)v and (1)
holds as a strict inequality; then, pi∗ = φ(v − f), a mass m∗− = σ∗ − φ(v − f) + h−1(fv )
of ﬁrms with θ < σ∗ applies for protection and (φ(v − f)− σ∗) v−fv + h−1(fv )fv patents are
issued;
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• there exists a high-R&D pooling equilibrium if and only if a(σ∗) ≤ v(1−h(1)) and f ≤ h(1)v;
then, pi∗ = φ(v − h(1)v) and (φ(v − h(1)v)− σ∗) (1− h(1)) + h(1) patents are issued.
It is immediate to write the key condition (1) in the following more intuitive way:
Lemma 3. For v > f , there exists a decreasing function F (.; v) : [0, (1−h(0)v) −→ (h(0)v, h(1)v)
such that within {(σ∗, f), σ∗ > 0, 0 < f < v − a(σ∗)}, the condition h(φ(v − f) − σ∗)v ≤ f is
equivalent to f ≥ F (σ∗, v).
High-R&D separating equilibria are of particular interest: they are characterized by signiﬁ-
cant R&D activity and they exhibit self-screening in the application process as only non-obvious
projects apply for patent protection. Therefore, only good patents are issued, i.e. patents that
would be granted under a perfect examination technology.20
In our model, a marginal increase in R&D investment stochastically increases the innova-
tiveness of the project, which is valuable only to the extent that it increases the probability of
obtaining a patent, i.e. only to the extent that it increases the probability of non-obvious projects
θ > σ∗. Therefore, R&D investment below σ∗ is useless; only at high level of R&D, hence for
high R&D marginal cost γ′(pi), does a marginal increase in R&D generate a positive marginal
proﬁt, equal to v−f the net value of a patent. A high application fee reduces the marginal value
of a patent and therefore reduces or even annihilates incentives to R&D. Similarly, a tough non-
obviousness standard implies that ﬁrms have to invest high levels of R&D to make a diﬀerence,
which might be too costly. This is why separating equilibria exist only if f + a(σ∗) ≤ v, i.e. if
the application fee and the non-obviousness standard are low enough.
The other condition for the existence of separating equilibria (f ≥ F (σ∗, v)) guarantees
that the number of non-obvious projects applying for patent protection is not too high, so that
the Patent Oﬃce is eﬀective enough in identifying poorly innovative projects, thereby deterring
applications by obvious innovations. This is the case when the application fee or the non-
obviousness standard are high enough (as F (., , v) is decreasing), as it limits the number of non-
obvious projects. We let DS ≡ {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; f + a(σ∗) ≤ v, f ≥ F (σ∗, v)} denote the domain
of parameter values for which separating equilibria exist; Figure 1 illustrates our discussion.
20Remember that we take σ∗ as given here and do not address the question of whether the non-obviousness
standard is too tough or too permissive.
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Figure 1: Equilibria
High-R&D pooling equilibria are also characterized by a signiﬁcant R&D activity, but the
process of granting patents cannot rely on self-screening and only rests on the imperfect exam-
ination. So, some obvious projects obtain unwarranted patent protection that is, they would
not be patented given the standard σ∗ if the examination technology were perfect. A marginal
increase in R&D induces a shift in the probability of getting a patent from h(1) for obvious
projects to 1 for non-obvious ones. In equilibrium, marginal beneﬁt equals marginal cost of R&D:
γ′(piP ) = v(1− h(1)), provided the non-obviousness standard is low enough for such an eﬀort to
be more proﬁtable than simply not investing at all in R&D. Moreover, the application fee has to
be small as well, so that applying for protection is attractive even for obvious projects. Therefore,
pooling equilibria exist within the domain DP ≡ {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; a(σ∗) ≤ v(1−h(1)), f ≤ h(1)v)}
of low application fees and low non-obviousness standard (see Figure 1).
Finally, the proposition proves that within a subset of DS , there also exists equilibria in
which some obvious innovations ask for patent protection. This multiplicity is not surprising as
the game of application for patent protection exhibits strategic complementarities, as is usual
for congestion models: when more ﬁrms apply, the congestion problem becomes more severe, it
becomes more likely for an obvious project to get patented, which translates into more numerous
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applications for obvious projects. Note that the mixed equilibrium is unstable in the following
sense: if a mass m < m∗− of ﬁrms apply for protection, h(φ(v − f) − σ∗ + m)v < f so that all
obvious projects would strictly prefer not to ask for protection, while if m > m∗−, all obvious
projects would be strictly prefer to ask for protection. Hence, we omit the mixed equilibrium in
our later discussion.21
3.2 Low-R&D and no-R&D equilibria
It is quite immediate to analyze low-R&D equilibria, i.e. equilibria with positive equilibrium
R&D such that 0 < pi∗ ≤ σ∗. The intuition provided in the previous subsection shows that a
low R&D activity generates obvious projects so that a marginal increase in R&D in this range
has no value. This clearly suggests that zero R&D is preferred to low R&D. This is formalized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. There cannot exist equilibria with low R&D, i.e. such that pi∗ ∈ (0, σ∗].
So we focus on no-R&D equilibria, pi∗ = 0, for which a mass m∗− ∈ [0, 1] of ﬁrms applies for
protection in equilibrium. Unsurprisingly, the set of no-R&D equilibria exhibits the same kind
of multiplicity due to strategic complementarity as in the previous subsection.
Proposition 3. If f > v, there exists a no-R&D equilibrium in which no ﬁrm applies for patent
protection. If f ≤ v:
• there exists a no-R&D equilibrium in which all ﬁrms apply for patent if and only if h(1)v ≥ f
and a(σ∗) ≥ v(1− h(1)); then, h(1) ﬁrms obtain protection;
• there exists a no-R&D equilibrium in which no ﬁrm applies for protection if and only if
h(0)v ≤ f < v and f + a(σ∗) ≥ v;
21 For completeness, it can be shown that:
• Within {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; f + a(σ∗) = v, f ≥ h(0)v}, which is a zero-measure set, there exist mixed-strategy
equilibria in which ﬁrms randomize between pi = φ(v−f) and pi = 0 and ask for patent protection according
to a separating or a mixed equilibrium in the application sub-game.
• Within DP , there exist mixed-strategy equilibria in which ﬁrms randomize between pi = φ(a(σ∗)) (with
probability a(σ
∗)
v(1−h(1)) ) and pi = 0 and ask all for patent protection; these equilibria are similar to the pooling
equilibria described in the text.
We omit these equilibria from our discussion, but see Proposition 5 in subsection 5.2.
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• there exists a no-R&D equilibrium in which some but not all ﬁrms apply for patent if and
only if h(0)v ≤ f < h(1)v and f + a(σ∗) ≥ v; then, a mass m∗− = h−1(fv ) of ﬁrms applies
and fvh
−1(fv ) patents are delivered.
Corollary 1. There exists a no-R&D equilibrium if and only if (σ∗, f) ∈ D0, with:
D0 ≡ {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; a(σ∗) ≥ min{v − h(1)v, v − f}}.
This proposition characterizes all cases in which the IP protection system is ineﬀective, i.e.
does not stimulate R&D at all.22 The intuition is similar to that of the previous subsection. First,
if the application fee is so high that a patent has negative net value (f > v), then no ﬁrm asks
for patent protection and there is no incentives to R&D at all. Second, the system may still be
ineﬀective even when the application fee is moderate (f < v): if the standard of non-obviousness
σ∗ is high enough, the probability that a ﬁrm comes up with a non-obvious project is too low
so that ﬁrms prefer not to invest in R&D. Within this domain, there are multiple equilibria in
terms of application strategies, depending on whether f is indeed low or not: if f is low, ﬁrms
can count on congestion in the examination process to obtain a patent, even though they have
obvious applications. Note again that equilibria with randomization are unstable and we omit
them in our discussion.
Equilibria without any patent application reﬂect a situation where the IP protection system
plays no role, neither positive nor negative, and could be removed. No-R&D equilibria in which
all ﬁrms apply for patent protection are however clearly quite unattractive: in such an equilibrium
with congestion of the Patent Oﬃce, the IP protection system does not stimulate R&D at all
and some patents are granted whereas no project would pass the novelty test if the examination
technology was perfect.
Finally, the corollary indicates that if congestion is a major impediment to the examination
process so that h(1) is close to 1, then there are only very speciﬁc values of the instruments of
IP protection (f, σ∗) that guarantee that R&D is positive in any equilibrium, i.e. that the IP
protection system serves its purpose. In other words, when congestion is a major problem, a
no-R&D equilibrium is likely to exist and the IP protection system may then be quite ineﬀective.
22See again Figure 1.
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4 Equilibrium properties
4.1 Multiplicity and comparative statics
In this subsection, we discuss the issue of multiplicity and compare the properties of the various
equilibria that can emerge. As a preliminary remark, we summarize in Corollary 2 the properties
of R&D eﬀorts in high-R&D equilibria.
Corollary 2. The R&D eﬀort in the pooling equilibrium increases as v increases, but does not
depend on f and σ∗. The R&D eﬀort in the separating (and mixed) equilibrium is an increasing
function of v, a decreasing function of f , and does not depend on σ∗.
In the separating equilibrium, the submission fee f is spent only for non-obvious projects
and therefore discourages R&D. In the pooling equilibrium, however, f is spent for all types of
projects; it acts as a ﬁxed cost and so, has no impact on R&D.23 The impact of v on R&D eﬀorts
is straightforward. Finally, the non-obviousness requirement has no impact on R&D eﬀorts:
in the pooling equilibrium all ﬁrms apply for a patent, whether their application is below or
above the requirement, and in the separating equilibrium the requirement does not aﬀect the
ﬁrms' marginal beneﬁt of investing in R&D. Therefore, the threshold σ∗ determines equilibrium
submission strategies but has no direct impact on R&D incentives.
The separating equilibrium exists within the domain DS . In D∗S ≡ {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; f+a(σ∗) <
v, f > h(1)v} ⊂ DS , it is moreover the unique equilibrium. In this case, the IP protection system
works perfectly, although the examination technology is noisy, because ﬁrms self-select in their
application strategies and invest in intense R&D programs. Note that when congestion is a
serious problem, i.e. when h(1) is close to 1, D∗S shrinks: multiplicity is most likely and with it,
the presence of no-R&D equilibria.
In DM ≡ {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; f + a(σ∗) ≤ v, F (σ∗, v) ≤ f ≤ h(1)v} ⊂ DS , Propositions 1 and
3 show that the separating equilibrium coexists with an equilibrium where all ﬁrms apply for a
patent with either some R&D eﬀort or none. In this range of values, there are multiple equilibria
and the Patent Oﬃce is unable to ensure that only good patents will be issued. We compare the
properties of the diﬀerent types of equilibria within this domain DM .
23Note however that renewal fees (maintenance fees due every four years after the patent grant in the U.S.)
may have an impact on the R&D eﬀort. This analysis would require a dynamic model.
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Corollary 3. Within DM , ﬁrms' proﬁts are lower, R&D eﬀorts are higher and good patents are
more numerous in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling equilibria.
When multiple equilibria exist, there is a pooling equilibrium with some or no R&D activity
and a high volume of applications, and a separating equilibrium with higher R&D activity, fewer
applications and more good patents. If indeed the pooling equilibrium prevails, congestion has
a clear negative impact on R&D: as examiners receive too many demands, the probability to
obtain a patent on a bad project increases, so incentives to innovate decrease and ﬁrms make a
weaker R&D eﬀort. Consequently, more patents are issued on obvious applications and there are
fewer non-obvious patents in the industry; in the end, issuance of obvious patents slows down
the pace of innovation.
The pooling equilibria are preferred ex ante by ﬁrms. Selecting among multiple equilibria is
problematic and we do not want to argue necessarily that the pooling equilibrium should prevail
because it is preferred by the ﬁrms. But conversely, the pooling equilibrium cannot be dismissed
as being implausible and the tension between social and industry valuation should raise at least
serious concerns about the functioning of the IP protection system in this range of parameter
values.
Corollary 4 compares the expected volume of patents delivered in the separating equilibrium
and the pooling equilibria (with low or no R&D) when multiple equilibria co-exist.
Corollary 4. Within DM , if φ(v − f) − σ∗ < h(1), the expected volume of patents delivered is
lower in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium.
Therefore, if the submission fee and / or the degree of non-obviousness requirement are high,
the Patent Oﬃce delivers more patents in the pooling equilibrium (with or with no R&D) than
in the separating equilibrium (with high R&D and fewer applications). This result shows that
there is not necessarily a correlation between the volume of patents granted and ﬁrms' R&D
activity.
While an IP protection system within D∗S works eﬀectively, there are strong arguments sug-
gesting that the range of multiplicity DM is also relevant. Indeed, recall that the R&D eﬀort
in the separating equilibrium is a decreasing function of f . For any normative viewpoint on
how f should be designed, f should be reduced as much as possible within D∗S to stimulate
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R&D. This would lead to ﬁxing f = h(1)v, a boundary on which another less appealing equi-
librium exists, with applications by obvious projects and therefore bad patents being delivered
with positive probability. In other words, the existing IP protection instruments (σ∗, f) are not
suﬃcient to solve unambiguously the trade-oﬀ between selecting only non-obvious applications
and encouraging R&D.
Therefore, when the Patent Oﬃce is subject to overload and congestion, the whole process
of patent application and evaluation may go through discontinuous changes of regime and may
not function properly due to a fundamental problem of strategic complementarity across ﬁrms
and multiplicity of equilibria that cannot be ﬁxed by setting appropriate levels for the classical
instruments of the IP protection system. Observing large swings in the number of applications
or of issued patents may be due to a shift from one equilibrium to the other, and therefore not
be related at all to small changes in the environment, e.g. to a change in the cost of R&D as
coming from technical change.
4.2 Introducing a penalty for rejected applications
The IP protection instruments (f, σ∗) are of limited eﬃciency to induce self-selection by non-
obvious projects and to stimulate R&D. Adding other instruments could help the Patent Oﬃce
select the separating equilibrium. In our setting, fees could be contingent on the Oﬃce's observ-
able decision; this amounts to introducing a penalty that a ﬁrm would have to pay if its projects
is proven to lack novelty or to be obvious, i.e. if the patent is rejected.24 This is not the case
for the moment, neither in the US nor in Europe or in Japan. While it has no impact on the
submission strategy for non-obvious projects, this penalty can modify the submission strategy
for other projects as well as the R&D eﬀort in equilibrium.
Let us therefore incorporate in the previous model a penalty b to be paid when the Patent
Oﬃce ﬁnds out a signal σ with σ < σ∗. It is immediate to see that the situation is the same as
if the submission fee were equal to f + b and the value of the patent were equal to v+ b. Hence,
the following characterization of equilibria:
Proposition 4. In the model with penalty for patent rejection, the characterization of equilibria
24In a legal discussion paper, Thomas (2001) suggests the similar idea of a "patent bounty", that would combine
a ﬁne to the applicant of a bad patent with a reward to the third party that would prove its invalidity (the latter
relates to "post grant reviews" used in the European Patent Oﬃce.
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follows that of Propositions 1-2-3 with separating equilibria with R&D eﬀort pi∗ = φ(v − f) in
DS ≡ {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; f + a(σ∗) ≤ v, f ≥ F (σ∗, v + b)− b},
pooling equilibria with R&D eﬀort pi∗ = φ((v + b)(1− h(1))) in
DP ≡ {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; a(σ∗) ≤ (v + b)(1− h(1)), f ≤ h(1)(v + b)− b},
and no-R&D equilibria in
D0 ≡ {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; a(σ∗) ≥ min{v + b− h(1)v, v − f}};
within D∗S ≡ {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; f + a(σ∗) < v, f + b > h(1)(v+ b)}, the separating equilibrium is the
unique equilibrium.
As shown on ﬁgure 2, if b increases, the domain of existence of no-R&D equilibria shrinks (it
is reduced by C+D), and the domain of existence of high-R&D separating equilibria DS expands
(by A) and the domain D∗S where the only equilibrium is the separating equilibrium also expands
(by B+C). The domain of existence of high-R&D pooling equilibria increases by D and decreases
by B.25
In the separating equilibrium, ﬁrms only apply for non-obvious patents, so none spends the
penalty; the penalty has no impact on R&D activity. In the pooling equilibrium, only ﬁrms with
obvious projects may have to incur the penalty b, so an increase in b increases incentives to have
a non-obvious project and therefore stimulates R&D.
Therefore the penalty would be a powerful instrument, as it would unambiguously encourage
R&D: in addition to reducing the domain of no-R&D and expanding that of separating equilibria,
it increases the R&D eﬀort in the pooling equilibrium.
However, the trade-oﬀ between encouraging R&D and selecting only non-obvious applications
still remains. Indeed, R&D activity is maximized with the smallest possible submission fee f
that induces the separating equilibrium, or the largest possible penalty b that induces the pooling
equilibrium. Reducing f or increasing b lead to the domain of multiple equilibria with positive
R&D. In that domain, the R&D eﬀort is higher in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling
equilibrium, but ﬁrms' proﬁt is higher in the latter, so the Patent Oﬃce may still be unable to
select only non-obvious applications.
25Overall, it expands if b is small compared to v (if b ≤ v(2h(1)−1)
2(1−h(1)) ) and shrinks otherwise. In a pooling
equilibrium, an increase in b increases the R&D eﬀort, as well as the number of patent grants.
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Figure 2: Impact of a penalty for rejected applications
5 Extensions
5.1 Imperfect commitment by the Patent Oﬃce
Throughout the model we have assumed that the standard σ∗ is determined ex ante, so ﬁrms
know it as they choose their R&D and submission strategies. However, since patent examination
is done by individuals (examiners), it can be considered as a rather subjective process, and the
Patent Oﬃce may not be able to commit to a standard. In that case, the threshold for non-
obviousness is determined ex post, once R&D has already been sunk and the Oﬃce has received
patent applications.
Ex post, the impact of granting patents on social welfare is unambiguously negative: the
monopoly power they grant leads to a deadweight loss and is therefore socially costly. Note
that the dynamic impact is ambiguous: when innovation is sequential and the ﬁrst generation
is patented, it can discourage R&D by subsequent innovators, but at the same time patents
imply disclosure of knowledge (relative to secrecy), which can enable subsequent innovations.26
However, in our static model we rule out dynamic considerations and interactions between inno-
vations; so, ceteris paribus, granting patents is socially costly.
26In addition, granting obvious patents creates a social cost of litigation when the patent is challenged in court.
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Therefore, if its mandate is aligned with social welfare, the Patent Oﬃce should reject all
applications ex post, i.e. σ∗ = 1. Anticipating this, ﬁrms have no incentives to invest in R&D.
Therefore, the Patent Oﬃce's ability to commit to a standard of non-obviousness σ∗ < 1 is
critical for the incentives to innovate provided by the patent system.
Another facet of the commitment problem is related to the fact that, even if the Patent
Oﬃce could perfectly commit to the standard σ∗, examination is performed by examiners whose
incentives may not be perfect. To illustrate this point, suppose an examiner in charge of n
applications must exert unobservable eﬀort e at cost ψ(e) (increasing convex) to assess the
existing prior art on these applications with an outcome given by the probability h˜(n, e) of not
ﬁnding prior art on an application θ < σ∗. As before, h˜(., .) increases in n but it decreases
in e. Suppose that no examination eﬀort leads to a zero probability of ﬁnding prior art, i.e.
h˜(n, 0) = 1. In this moral hazard situation, a Patent Oﬃce examiner can be rewarded only on
the basis of the observable variables at the level of the Oﬃce that is, on the basis of the number
of applications and the number of those rejected because prior art has been found.
In such a setting, the IP protection system cannot be perfectly eﬀective because there cannot
exist high-R&D separating equilibria. For, suppose there exists one. Then all applications
would be non-obvious and the examiner would have no incentives whatsoever to exert eﬀort as
he could not possibly reject one of the applications. Formally, condition (1) with e = 0 and
h˜(pi∗ − σ∗, 0) = 1 would amount to v ≤ f . Equilibria in this extended framework must therefore
imply bad patents (if only a high-R&D pooling equilibrium exists) or low R&D (if a no-R&D
equilibrium prevails). Our emphasis on this weakness of the IP protection system is therefore
reinforced in such a setting.27
5.2 The value of patent protection depends on the number of patents
In the model, we assumed that the proﬁtability of a patent does not depend on the number of
patents granted in the industry, so we ruled out interactions between innovations. However it
would be more realistic to assume that there is competition between innovations. One possible
reason is the overlap between patents: as more patents are granted, the monopoly power of a
patent holder is eroded by the overlapping patents (Hunt, 2004). Another reason is dynamic
27Solving completely the model with examiner's eﬀort is feasible, but it would not add to our understanding of
the forces at work here.
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competition: as more patents are granted, the duration of monopoly for a current patent holder
is smaller, so the value associated with obtaining a patent is lower (Hunt, 2004).28 In this
subsection, we analyze the situation where the number of patents granted has a negative impact
on the value of patent protection.
Let v(x) denote the expected value of obtaining a patent when x patents are granted, and
assume it decreases with the total number of patents: v′(x) < 0. There is now a force counter-
acting the fact that congestion increases the probability of obtaining a patent and therefore
induces ﬁrms to apply for patent protection: the larger the number of expected patents delivered,
the lower the value of obtaining a patent, and therefore, the lower the incentives to apply for
patent protection. We will assume that xv(x) is increasing in x, so that the congestion eﬀect
remains dominant.
A complete analysis would be tedious. So, we focus on emphasizing the robustness of our
ﬁndings and illustrating new interesting phenomena. Moreover, we mostly limit our investigation
to the following case: h(n) = n, so that congestion eﬀects are easily tractable. In this special
case, Propositions 1, 2 and 3 indicate that for some policy instruments, there exists a (pure
strategy) high-R&D equilibrium, and it is separating (DS 6= ∅); yet, there also always exists a
no-R&D equilibrium (D0 = R2+) so that the high-R&D separating equilibrium is never the unique
equilibrium (D∗S = ∅); ﬁnally, there never exists a high-R&D pooling equilibrium (DP = ∅).
The following proposition should be contrasted with these results.
Proposition 5. Consider the model in which the value of patent protection depends on the
number of granted patents and h(n) = n:
• there exists a no-R&D equilibrium with no patent applications if and only if f + a(σ∗) ≥
v(0); there exists a no-R&D equilibrium with all ﬁrms applying for patent protection if
and only if f ≤ v(1); therefore, there exists a no-R&D equilibrium except in the domain
D1 ≡ {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; f + a(σ∗) ≤ v(0), f ≥ v(1)};
• there never exists a high-R&D pooling equilibrium;
28Hunt (2004) studies a model with sequential innovation, where a patent is replaced by the next generation's
innovation, and the patent holder's proﬁt is driven to zero. A stronger patentability reduces the probability that
the next generation's innovation will be patentable, so it prolongs the expected duration of monopoly of a patent
holder.
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• there exists a non-empty domain DS = {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; f + a(σ∗) ≤ v(xS(f, σ∗)), f ≥
xS(f, σ∗)v(xS(f, σ∗))} in which there exists a high-R&D separating equilibrium; then, R&D
eﬀort piS(f, σ∗) uniquely solves: pi = φ(v(pi − σ∗) − f), and it is decreasing in f and
increasing in σ∗;
• within the domain D∗∗S ≡ {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; f + a(σ∗) ≤ v(xS(f, σ∗)), f ≥ v(1)} ⊂ D1, the
unique equilibrium is the separating high-R&D equilibrium with piS(f, σ∗);
• for some values of the policy instruments, e.g. within the domain {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; v(xS(f, σ∗)) <
f+a(σ∗) < v(0), f ≥ v(1)} ⊂ D1, the equilibrium involves strictly mixed strategies in R&D
activity, i.e. ﬁrms randomize between R&D eﬀort piS(f, σ∗) and 0.
The negative impact of the number of patents granted on the value of patents induces a
counter-active force on the congestion phenomenon. This translates into the fact that it is pos-
sible to design policy instruments so that there is some R&D activity in the unique equilibrium.
As a new result, R&D eﬀort may be random in some other range of the parameters, with some
ﬁrms ending up exerting R&D eﬀort and others no exerting R&D eﬀort at all. Yet, the domain
D1, in which there exists no no-R&D equilibrium, is rather limited: in the neighborhood of the
model of section 2, i.e. when v(x) = v + εw(x) with ε small, D1 shrinks as ε goes to 0.
As expected, a stricter standard of non-obviousness and a lower submission fee lead to more
R&D in the separating equilibrium. However, the maximum σ∗ and the minimum f such that
the separating equilibrium exists are such that there exists an equilibrium with no R&D, as in
the basic model. Therefore, there is still a trade-oﬀ between the level of innovative activity and
the number of applications in equilibrium.
Finally it is also interesting to mention the possibility of high-R&D pooling equilibria in the
model with a general congestion function h(.). Then, R&D eﬀort is the unique solution of:
piP = φ(v[h(1) + (1− h(1))(piP − σ∗)][1− h(1)]),
so that piP is increasing in the non-obviousness standard σ
∗. As in Proposition 1, the submission
still has a negative impact on the R&D eﬀort in the separating equilibrium and has no impact
on the R&D eﬀort in the pooling equilibrium; but now, both piS and piP increase with the
non-obviousness standard σ∗. Echoing Corollary 3, it is still the case that when separating
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and pooling high-R&D equilibria co-exist, R&D is higher in the separating equilibrium.29 The
diﬀerence between ﬁrms' expected proﬁt in the pooling equilibrium and ﬁrms' expected proﬁts
in the separating equilibrium is not unambiguously positive, however; it is a decreasing function
of the submission fee f , but it is negative for values of f close to h(1)v(xP ).30
5.3 Innovativeness aﬀects the value of patent protection
The model so far makes the restrictive assumption that the value of patent protection does not
depend on the degree of inventiveness θ of the innovation. One may argue that more innovative
innovations, if protected, generate higher marketing proﬁts, so that v should be an increasing
function of θ. It is not entirely convincing, though, as more inventive innovations do not neces-
sarily meet more proﬁtable demands and, at the same time, a standard technology (low θ) that
is patented may induce full monopolization of a proﬁtable market segment and therefore may
generate high proﬁts. So, there is a weak case for considering that the value of patent protection
is increasing in innovativeness and we show that our model predictions are qualitatively robust
to this extension.
More precisely, let us suppose that a project of innovativeness θ generates proﬁts v(θ) if
protected by a patent, with v(.) : [0, 1]→ R+ non decreasing and let us assume that v(.)−γ′(.) is
decreasing: the impact of innovativeness on the value of patent protection is limited compared to
how fast the marginal cost of R&D increases with eﬀort. This assumption guarantees a minimal
concavity property in the programs that follow and is in line with the absence of compelling
29The pooling equilibrium exists only if f ≤ h(1)v(xP ). Given that v(.) is decreasing,
v(piP − σ∗)− f > v(piP − σ∗ + (1− h(1))(1− (piP − σ∗)))− f
= v(xP )− f ≥ v(xP )(1− h(1)).
Therefore, φ(v(piP−σ∗)−f) > φ(v(xP )(1−h(1))) = piP . If piS ≤ piP , piS = φ(v(piS−σ∗)−f) > φ(v(piP−σ∗)−f) ≥
piP , a contradiction. Therefore, piS > piP .
30The diﬀerence between the ex ante proﬁts in the pooling and in the separating is:
Aσ∗(v(xP )(1− h(1)))−Aσ∗(v(xS)− f) + h(1)v(xP )− f.
Given that ∂xS
∂f
= −φ
′
1−φ′v′ as shown in the appendix, the derivative of this diﬀerence with respect to f is equal to:
−1 + 1
1− φ′v′ [φ(v(xS)− f)− σ
∗] < 0.
The pooling exists only if f ≤ h(1)v(xP ) and for this value, the diﬀerence equals:
Aσ∗(v(xP )− h(1)v(xP ))−Aσ∗(v(xS)− h(1)v(xP )).
But piS > piP is equivalent to φ(v(xS)− f) > φ(v(xP )−h(1)v(xP )) and so, v(xS)− f > v(xP )−h(1)v(xP ), which
means that the diﬀerence is negative for f = h(1)v(xP ).
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arguments for a steep v(.) function. To simplify the analysis, let us moreover assume that
congestion takes the extreme form: h(n) = n, as in the previous subsection.
Although the complete analysis is tedious, the following proposition shows that the main
conclusions of the basic model (with h(n) = n) are robust to this modeling change.
Proposition 6. Consider the model in which innovativeness aﬀects the value of patents and
h(n) = n; then, as in the basic model,
• there exists a no-R&D equilibrium for all values of the policy instruments (f, σ∗);
• for some values of the policy instruments (f, σ∗), there exists high-R&D equilibria;
• in all equilibria with non-trivial R&D, R&D eﬀort is given by pˆi(f), that uniquely solves
v(pˆi)− f − γ′(pˆi) = 0,
some obvious projects refrain from applying for patent protection, but there may be bad
patents in equilibrium.
Policy instruments cannot avoid the existence of no-R&D equilibria. When well designed, the
policy instruments can lead to the existence of high-R&D equilibria as well, in which R&D eﬀort is
a decreasing function of the application fee and in which at least some poorly innovative projects
refrain from applying for a patent: such an equilibrium generalizes the high-R&D separating
equilibrium of the basic model.
6 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a model of the IP protection system, in particular of the patent issuance
process. We formalized the overload problem within Patent Oﬃces, echoing the well-documented
evidence of a worldwide congestion. In a basically static model focusing on a simple represen-
tation of the current patent system, we analyzed the consequences on R&D activity and on the
ﬁrms' strategies when applying for patent protection. Our conclusions point toward the possibil-
ity of a systemic malfunctioning as a result of opportunistic patent applications in an overload
situation. Consequently, more bad patents are being issued, with the possibility of multiple
equilibria. These problems cannot be resolved by standard control instruments only.
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Our model obviously suﬀers from several limitations. First, R&D is a continuous and often
cumulative process, with patent applications landing in the Patent Oﬃce's mailbox relentlessly.
The Oﬃce's policy may evolve over time, and the examination process may become more or less
eﬃcient according to the knowledge accumulated in previous patents; in the long run, it is also
likely that reputation will play a more prominent role than the mere commitment to some given
criteria.
Second, the Oﬃce's actual toolkit is more complex and more sophisticated than formalized
here. Patent applications are examined sequentially, in the order in which they entered the
Oﬃce, and the Oﬃce can adjust the processing speed or prioritize applications. Following up on
an idea introduced by Lichtman and Lemley (2007) which was recently carried on by the Obama
administration,31 the USPTO is thinking about oﬀering a menu of procedures, i.e. a two-tiered
patent system, that would allow applicants to pay a higher fee for tighter Patent Oﬃce scrutiny,
resulting in a "gold-plated" patent. Such a screening process would give patents the beneﬁt of
a stronger presumption of validity in court, which would make it more valuable.32 Overall, it
would be interesting to address the issue of the optimal design for the IP protection system,
taking into account the possibility of congestion.
Third, the IP protection system relies not just on the ex ante control performed by Patent
Oﬃces, but also on ex post invalidation procedures arbitrated by courts. A few economic con-
tributions have started to devise a theoretical framework for this dual regulatory institution
(Chiou, 2008), and it would be interesting to investigate how the overload problem that we ana-
lyzed would be aﬀected in a wider context. The main eﬀect on our settings would be to make the
value of patent protection endogenous, as it would then depend on the competitors' incentives
to contest the patent, based on their beliefs about the average quality of patents.
Finally, the Patent Oﬃce itself could be viewed as an Agent acting on behalf of Congress, but
with its own agenda. The Oﬃce has a number of examiners on its payroll, and their incentives
should also be more precisely formalized. An overall approach in terms of optimal regulation
within an agency framework could then be developed.
These limitations, along with other fascinating issues, provide material for future research.
31See http : //www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/technology/Fact_sheet_innovation_and_technology.pdf
32In a recent paper, Atal and Bar (2009) formalize this idea and study its impact on the volume and quality of
patent applications and grants.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In a separating equilibrium, the application strategy is a best response for ﬁrms only if h(pi∗ −
σ∗)v ≤ f ≤ v. The expected proﬁts of a ﬁrm choosing its R&D are then given by:33
V (pi) = (pi − σ∗)+(v − f)− γ(pi). (2)
V (.) is decreasing concave within [0, σ∗], concave within (σ∗, 1] with an upward kink at σ∗. A
positive global maximum arises at pi∗ = φ(v − f) only if Aσ∗(v − f) ≥ 0 (which implies that
φ(v − f) > σ∗). Conversely, under these conditions, the posited strategy consisting in pi∗ =
φ(v − f) and in application for protection whenever θ ≥ σ∗ obviously sustains an equilibrium.
In a mixed equilibrium, ﬁrms θ < σ∗ must be indiﬀerent between applying for protection or
not, i.e. h(pi∗ − σ∗ + m∗−)v = f . Apart from this, the analysis of expected proﬁts and of the
equilibrium R&D is similar to the previous case. So, a mixed equilibrium exists if and only if
Aσ∗(v − f) ≥ 0, (1) and f ≤ h(1)v hold, with (1) as a strict inequality; pi∗ = φ(v − f) and m∗−
is determined by h(φ(v − f) − σ∗ + m∗−)v = f . Note that several type of mixed equilibria may
exist: to achieve m∗−, it can be that either all ﬁrms θ < σ∗ randomize (applying with probability
m∗−
σ∗+1−φ(v−f)), or that ﬁrms apply above a threshold θ
∗ (with θ∗ = σ∗−m∗−), or any combination.
In a pooling equilibrium, all ﬁrms apply for protection so that h(1)v ≥ f necessarily holds.
The expected proﬁts of a ﬁrm choosing its R&D are given by:
V (pi) = vh(1) + v(1− h(1))(pi − σ∗)+ − γ(pi)− f. (3)
A positive maximum arises at piP = φ(v − h(1)v) only if Aσ∗(v − h(1)v) ≥ 0. Conversely, under
this condition, such a pooling equilibrium trivially exists.
Finally, from Lemma 1, it is immediate that Aσ∗(v − f) ≥ 0 is equivalent to f ≤ v − a(σ∗),
for σ∗ ∈ [0, a−1(v)] and Aσ∗(v − h(1)v) ≥ 0 is equivalent to a(σ∗) ≤ v(1− h(1)).
8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
On such an equilibrium path, (almost) all ﬁrms end up with θ < σ∗. If ﬁrms do not expect
to get strictly valuable protection with positive probability, the expected proﬁt function when
33We use the notation: x+ = sup{0, x}.
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a ﬁrm chooses its R&D is strictly decreasing for pi ∈ [0, σ∗]. Therefore, it is necessary that in
equilibrium a positive mass applies for protection and that h(1)v > f . But then, v > f and ﬁrms
would also apply if they turned out to get θ > σ∗. The expected proﬁts function is therefore:
V (pi) = vh(1) + v(1− h(1))(pi − σ∗)+ − γ(pi)− f,
whose maximum can only be equal to 0 or to piP = φ((1− h(1))v) > σ∗.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
All ﬁrms apply for a patent (m∗− = 1) only if h(1)v ≥ f ; the expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm choosing
its R&D ex ante is given by (3). If the ﬁrm makes no R&D eﬀort (pi = 0), V (0) = h(1)v−f ≥ 0.
Therefore, an equilibrium with zero R&D and all ﬁrms applying for patent protection exists only
if h(1)v ≥ f and Aσ∗(v − h(1)v) ≤ 0. These conditions are obviously suﬃcient.
No ﬁrm applies for a patent (m∗− = 0) if h(0)v ≤ f ; if, in addition, v ≤ f , the expected
proﬁt function of a ﬁrm choosing its R&D is equal to −γ(pi), and therefore leads to pi∗ = 0. If
h(0)v ≤ f < v, the expected proﬁt function of a ﬁrm choosing its R&D is given by (2). The
equilibrium exists only if h(0)v ≤ f and either v ≤ f or Aσ∗(v − f) ≤ 0. Suﬃciency is obvious.
If m∗− ∈ (0, 1), then necessarily h(m∗−)v = f . The analysis is then similar to the previous
case when v > f .
8.4 Proof of Corollary 3
Firms' expected proﬁt is V S = Aσ∗(v−f) in the separating equilibrium, V P = Aσ∗(v(1−h(1))+
vh(1)− f in the high R&D pooling equilibrium and V 0 = vh(1)− f in the no-R&D equilibrium
where all ﬁrms apply. A necessary condition for multiple equilibria to arise is f ≤ vh(1). First,
V 0−V S = vh(1)−f−Aσ∗(v−f) is a decreasing function of f (its derivative is −1+φ(v−f)−σ∗ ≤
0); when the no-R&D equilibrium exists with application by all projects, a(σ∗ ≥ v(1−h(1)) and
so, V 0−V S is positive for f = vh(1). Therefore, when the separating equilibrium co-exists with
the no-R&D equilibrium, V 0 ≥ V S . Second, V P −V S = vh(1)−f−Aσ∗(v−f)+Aσ∗(v(1−h(1))
is also a decreasing function of f , and is null when f = vh(1). Therefore, when the separating
equilibrium co-exists with the high R&D pooling equilibrium, V P ≥ V S .
Moreover, the R&D eﬀort is higher in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling equi-
librium if and only if φ(v − f) ≥ φ(v(1− h(1))⇔ v − f ≥ v(1− h(1))⇔ vh(1) ≥ f . Hence the
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conclusion.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 5
In a separating equilibrium with high R&D piS , there are piS −σ∗ applications and xS = piS −σ∗
patents are granted. The ﬁrms' R&D eﬀort at the equilibrium is determined implicitly by:
piS = φ(v(xS)− f). Note that the equation:
piS = φ(v(piS − σ∗)− f)
is such that the left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side when piS goes to 1, while it is
smaller when piS goes to σ
∗, since f + a(σ∗) ≤ v(0) implies that v(0) − f ≥ a(σ∗) > γ′(σ∗).
This proves the existence of (piS , xS). Uniqueness follows from the fact that the right-hand side
is decreasing in piS . Total diﬀerentiation then gives:
(1− φ′v′)dpiS = −φ′v′dσ∗ − φ′df
(1− φ′v′)dxS = −dσ∗ − φ′df,
hence the variations of piS . As in the basic analysis, a separating equilibrium exists if and only if
Aσ∗(v(xS)− f) ≥ 0 and h(piS)v(xS) ≤ f ≤ v(xS). Note that there also exist mixed strategy (in
applications) equilibria within this range. The non-existence of pooling equilibria follows from
the same analysis as in the basic model.
In an equilibrium where ﬁrms make no R&D eﬀort and all apply for a patent, x = 1 patents
are granted. Such an equilibrium exists only only if v(1) ≥ f and this condition is obviously
suﬃcient. In an equilibrium with no-R&D and no ﬁrms applying for patent protection, 0 patents
are granted, so this equilibrium exists only if 0 ≤ f and Aσ∗(v(0) − f) ≤ 0, which are also
suﬃcient conditions. The characterization of D1 and D∗∗S follows straightforwardly.
Finally, let us consider the domain {(σ∗, f) ∈ R2+; v(xS(f, σ∗)) < f+a(σ∗) < v(0), f ≥ v(1)}.
From our analysis, no equilibrium with pure strategies in R&D eﬀort exists. Consider the
following system:
pi∗ = φ(v(x∗)− f)
x∗ = α(pi∗ − σ∗);
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for the same reasons as above, there exists a unique solution (pi∗, x∗) as a function of (α, f, σ∗).
Let us then examine the equation:
v(x∗) = a(σ∗) + f. (4)
When α goes to 0, x∗ goes to 0 and the left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side; when
α goes to 1, x∗ goes to xS and, from the assumption, the left-hand side is smaller than the
right-hand side. Hence there exists α∗ that solves the equation.
Consider now the following strategies for ﬁrms: randomize R&D eﬀort by choosing pi∗(α∗, f, σ∗)
with probability α∗ and 0 with probability 1 − α∗; then, apply for patent protection whenever
θ > σ∗ and refrain otherwise. Firms expect α∗(pi∗ − σ∗) applications that will all be accepted.
Their application strategy is an equilibrium strategy because v(1) ≤ f ≤ v(x∗) and since by
assumption v(1) ≥ x∗v(x∗), this implies: x∗v(x∗) ≤ f ≤ v(x∗). Moreover, ﬁrms' expected proﬁts
ex ante have two maxima: one at pi = 0 and one at pi∗; hence, randomization is a best response
for ﬁrms. It follows that the postulated strategies sustain an equilibrium.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose that v(0) ≥ f and consider the following strategies: no ﬁrm exerts R&D eﬀort and
ﬁrms always apply for patent protection, whatever their project. Since v(0) ≥ f , for any θ,
v(θ) ≥ f . Given that all ﬁrms apply, a ﬁrm with project θ therefore applies for protection as a
best response. The expected proﬁts of a particular ﬁrm investing pi in R&D equals:
v(0) +
∫ pi
0
[v(θ)− v(0)]dθ − γ(pi)− f,
which is decreasing in pi.34 Therefore, all ﬁrms choose pi = 0. The proposed strategies therefore
sustain an equilibrium.
Suppose instead that f > v(0) and let θ¯(f) ≡ inf{v−1(f), 1} > 0. Consider the following
strategies: no R&D eﬀort and patent application for θ ≥ sup{σ∗, θ¯(f)}. If all ﬁrms follow these
strategies, there is no application in equilibrium (since all projects are non-novel) and therefore
a ﬁrm applies if and only if v(θ) ≥ f and θ ≥ σ∗. The expected proﬁts of a particular ﬁrm
investing pi ≥ sup{σ∗, θ¯(f)} in R&D equals:∫ pi
sup{σ∗,θ¯(f)}
[v(θ)− f ]dθ − γ(pi)
34The derivative in pi equals v(pi)− v(0)− γ′(pi); it is decreasing in pi and non-positive for pi = 0.
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and they are equal to −γ(pi) otherwise. The derivative of this expected proﬁt function for
pi ≥ sup{σ∗, θ¯(f)} is equal to v(pi) − γ′(pi) − f ; since it is decreasing in pi, v(pi) − γ′(pi) − f ≤
v(0)− f − γ′(0) < 0. So, the best R&D choice for a ﬁrm is pi = 0.
Therefore, whatever (f, σ∗), there exists a no-R&D equilibrium, which proves the ﬁrst part
of the proposition.
It is immediate to prove that there cannot exist low-R&D equilibria in this setting either.
There cannot exist a high-R&D equilibrium where all ﬁrms apply, i.e. a full pooling equilib-
rium, irrespective of their innovativeness, since all would have probability 1 of being patented
(h(1) = 1) and therefore none would have any incentives to invest in R&D. Provided it exists, a
non-zero-R&D equilibrium is therefore characterized by pi∗ > σ∗ and by θ∗, the critical value of
innovativeness such that ﬁrms in equilibrium apply if and only if θ ≥ θ∗ (a immediate version of
Lemma 2 applies). Diﬀerent cases must be investigated depending on the relative position of θ∗
and σ∗.
There cannot exist a high-R&D equilibrium such that σ∗ < θ∗ ≤ pi∗. For, if it existed,
v(θ∗) = f . The expected proﬁts of a ﬁrm investing pi would equal −γ(pi) if pi < θ∗ and∫ pi
θ∗
(v(θ)− f)dθ − γ(pi)
if pi > θ∗. Within the range pi > θ∗, the slope of the expected proﬁts is equal to v(pi)−γ′(pi)− f ;
it is decreasing and negative for pi = θ∗ since v(θ∗) = f . A ﬁrm would then invest pi = 0, a
contradiction.
Suppose an equilibrium exists such that 0 < θ∗ ≤ σ∗ < pi∗. Then, patent application for
θ ≥ θ∗ is a best response only if (pi∗ − σ∗)v(θ∗) ≤ f ≤ v(σ∗) and, if θ∗ < σ∗, it must be that
(pi∗ − θ∗)v(θ∗) = f . The expected proﬁts of a ﬁrm investing pi are given by −γ(pi) for pi < θ∗,∫ pi
θ∗ [(pi
∗ − σ∗)v(θ)− f ]dθ − γ(pi) if θ∗ ≤ pi < σ∗, and∫ σ∗
θ∗
[(pi∗ − σ∗)v(θ)− f ]dθ +
∫ pi
σ∗
(v(θ)− f)dθ − γ(pi)
if pi ≥ σ∗. On the range (θ∗, σ∗), if indeed θ∗ < σ∗, the derivative of this expression equals
(pi∗ − σ∗)v(pi) − f − γ′(pi). As v(.) − γ′(.) is decreasing, (pi∗ − σ∗)v(pi) − f − γ′(pi) ≤ (pi∗ −
σ∗)v(θ∗)−f −γ′(θ∗) = −γ′(θ∗) < 0. Expected proﬁts are therefore decreasing within this range.
For pi > σ∗, the derivative equals v(pi) − f − γ′(pi). For such a high-R&D equilibrium to exist,
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it is necessary that v(σ∗) − f − γ′(σ∗) > 0. Then, there exists a unique pˆi(f) (continuity and
monotonicity of v − γ′), such that:
v(pˆi)− f − γ′(pˆi) = 0.
It must then be that:
∫ σ∗
θ∗
[(pi∗ − σ∗)v(θ)− f ]dθ +
∫ pˆi(f)
σ∗
(v(θ)− f)dθ − γ(pˆi(f)) ≥ 0.
The necessary conditions found out are suﬃcient for strategies with R&D eﬀort pˆi(f) to constitute
an equilibrium.
It follows that the set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a high-R&D
equilibrium with θ∗ = σ∗ are: (pˆi(f) − σ∗)v(σ∗) ≤ f < v(σ∗) − γ′(σ∗) and ∫ pˆi(f)σ∗ (v(θ) − f)dθ −
γ(pˆi(f)) ≥ 0. Suppose f ∈ (pˆi(v(0))v(0), v(0)). Then, there exists ε > 0 such that for σ∗ < ε, the
double inequality holds. Moreover, for σ∗ = 0, the integral condition writes down as:∫ pˆi(f)
0
(v(θ)− f − γ′(θ))dθ > 0,
holding as a strict inequality. Therefore, there exists an open neighborhood of {(f, σ∗), pˆi(v(0))v(0) <
f < v(0), σ∗ = 0} in which there exists a high-R&D equilibrium with θ∗ = σ∗. Note that such
high R&D equilibrium is the only equilibrium for which there are only good patents, i.e. only
projects with θ ≥ σ∗ get patent protection.
For the sake of completeness, there may also exist high-R&D equilibria with 0 < θ∗ < σ∗ < pi∗
and high-R&D equilibria with θ∗ = 0, in which case ﬁrms with no innovation randomize and
apply with probability m. In this latter case, we know that m < 1, as there cannot exists a
high-R&D equilibrium in which all ﬁrms apply (see above). And in these equilibria, there are
projects with θ ∈ (θ∗, σ∗) that get patented, i.e. there are bad patents.
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